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itable relief m respect to that transact10n, a court 
:pplying this maxim wil~ r~fuse relief. The ~axim 
·s a reflection of the pnnc1ple of that eqmty op-
~rated as a court of conscience. ~ court cannot be 
used to promote or condone cnmes or breaches 
of public morality. Thus, if a person seeks to set 
aside a transaction on the ground Qf fraud he must 
be free of any participation in the fraud. The 
maxim constitutes a defense only to equitable 
*remedies, injunction, and specific performance, 
for example. It does not apply to common-law 
remedies. 
Laches. This defense is associated with maxim: 
"Equity aids the vigilant." Broadly defined, 
"!aches" is any unreasonable delay by a person 
possessing a legal right in enforcing that legal right 
that produces prejudice to the person against 
whom the legal right is being enforced. In addi-
tion, the holder of a right may by his conduct be 
fairly regarded as waiving that right. A court will 
not grant an equitable remedy in favor of a person 
whose conduct amounts to laches or acquiescence. 
The prejudice following from the delay may be to 
third parties. 
Estoppel. Estoppel is a substantive equitable 
principle that precludes a party to a legal proceed-
ing from asserting against another facts, rights, or 
absence of legal rights. The object of estoppel is 
to preclude unconscionable departure by a person 
for an assumption for which he or she bears re-
sponsibility and that has been adopted by another 
as a basis for action or inaction, to his detriment. 
Estoppel existed as common law, as well as in eq-
uity. Equitable estoppel precluded the enforce-
ment of equitable relief. 
The major development was *promissory estop-
pel in which one party to a *contract who repre-
sents he will not enforce his rights, will be pre-
cluded from that enforcement. In this form 
estoppel remains a defense and this is properly 
described as equitable. The courts, however, in 
Anglo-American law began to accept that prom-
issory estoppel could be cause of action where one 
party makes a representation to another which is 
relied upon to his detriment. 
Constructive Trust. The courts of equity devised 
the institution of the *trust. Trusts are often ex-
pressly created by parties. A trustee holds property 
for the benefit of another, the beneficiary. The 
trustee holds the legal estate, the beneficiary, the 
equitable estate. Equity imposes exacting obliga-
tions on the trustee to handle the property for the 
benefit of the beneficiary. 
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A constructive trust is imposed where it would 
be unconscionable for the legal owner to retain 
the benefit of the equitable estate. The construc-
tive trust is remedial in nature, although it effects 
a change in the nature of property. Constructive 
trusts are imposed for a number of reasons in-
cluding giving recognition of a preexisting prop-
erty right, enforcing equitable principles, encour-
aging observance of equitable obligations, 
deterrence of breaches of fiduciary duties and 
remedying unconscionable behavior including un-
just enrichment. The constructive trust is a dis-
cretionary remedy, the imposition of which turns 
on the courts review of the rights of third parties 
and the conduct of the parties-it is a powerful 
remedy. The constructive trust gives a property in-
terest enforceable against purchases to the bene-
ficiary who has notice of the circumstances leading 
to the imposition of the constructive trust. The 
equity courts allowed holders of equitable rights 
to trace that as property into the hands of others. 
Like the express trustee, a constructive trustee is 
personally liable to compensate the beneficiary for 
losses caused in mishandling the property and to 
account for any profits made for its use. 
In these maxims, defenses, and institutions of 
equity the common theme is that equity will not 
allow legal rights to be enforced in a harsh and 
unconscionable way, and will create remedies, like 
constructive trust, to more thoroughly and flexibly 
deliver just results beyond the parameters of legal 
rights and remedies. 
[See also Procedure, Civil] 
• Jairus W. Perry, ed. Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 12th 
ed., 1877. J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal 
History, 3d ed., 1990. P. C. Hoffer, The Law's Conscience: 
Equitable Constitutionalism in America, 1990. D. Parkin-
son, The Principles of Equity, 1996. 
-David F. Partlett 
EQUITY JURISDICTION. See Equity. 
ERIE RAILROAD V. TOMPKINS 304 U.S. 64 
(1938), limited the power of federal courts to cre-
ate judge-made law that would displace state law. 
Jurists view the Supreme Court's decision both a 
modern cornerstone of American judicial *feder-
alism and an example of legal realism's influence. 
Prior to Erie, federal *courts applied state stat-
utory law, but did not feel bound to apply state 
*common law rules in areas of general law, such 
as torts and contracts. Instead, federal courts cre-
ated their own common law in these areas. This 
was not viewed as displacing state authority be-
cause law, from a jurisprudential standpoint, was 
-'-
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thought to exist independently of any sovereign; 
thus, federal courts were as competent as state 
courts to ascertain the true common law. The Erie 
decision reflected growing concern about the un-
fairness of having different legal principles apply 
solely on the basis of whether the plaintiff brought 
the case in state or federal court. It also reflected 
legal realism's emergence as a jurisprudential the-
ory and a rejection of the notion that common 
law is a transcendental body of law existing in-
dependently of any sovereign. The Erie holding 
that federal courts do not have the power to create 
general common law reflects the realist under-
standing that, if a federal court announces a com-
mon law rule, it is creating federal law and must 
have a basis of authority in the U.S. *Constitution. 
The Court found no such general authority, al-
though federal courts can develop their own rules 
of procedure. 
[See also Commercial Law; Swift v. Tyson 
(1842)] 
• John H. Ely, "The Irrepressible Myth of Erie," Harvard 
Law Review 87 (1974): 693-740. 
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Testate Esates 
Intestate Estates 
-Wendy C. Perdue 
ESTATE: TESTATE ESTATES 
The owner of *property may dispose of it at death 
by a *will. The will is a formal document signed 
by the property owner, the "testator," and wit-
nessed at its signing by two individuals. At the 
testator's death the will is submitted to a court to 
establish its validity. This is referred to as the "pro-
bate" (proving) of the will. The testator is said to 
die "testate." 
The will was part of the English legal heritage 
of the American colonists. It was recognized by 
the English Statute of Wills (1540), a law based on 
existing customs. During the nineteenth century, 
American states tended to adopt more formal 
rules governing the execution of wills, and they 
treated land and personal property as the same for 
the purpose of disposition by will. Generally, only 
wealthy persons made wills in the nineteenth cen-
tury, and wills were prepared by testators on their 
deathbed more frequently than in modern prac-
tice, with its focus on estate planning. After 1900, 
wealthy testators began to engage in careful plan-
ning of will provisions in order to minimize estate 
taxes and provide for future contingencies. 
The will usually designates an executor, who 
during probate is appointed by the court to ad-
m1mster the estate of the testator. The executor 
collects the assets of the testator, pays the testator's 
creditors, the administration expenses, and any es-
tate taxes owed by the estate, and distributes the 
remainder to those named in the will. The exec-
utor functions under the supervision of the court. 
The law of the state in which the testator was a 
resident at the time of death governs the will and 
the administration of the estate, except that federal 
estate taxes may be applicable to the estate. 
In order to execute a valid will a testator must 
have the requisite mental capacity. This require-
ment is important because many testators are el-
derly. The testator must have the capacity to know 
the nature of his property, know the natural ob-
jects of his bounty, form an orderly disposition, 
and understand the disposition in his will. In ad-
dition, the testator must be free from undue in-
fluence in the execution of his will. An elderly tes-
tator may become subject to the influence of a 
person to such an extent that he cannot resist do-
ing what that person wants him to do. This may 
result in executing a will that makes a disposition 
of property to such person that is unusual. If un-
due influence is judged to exist, the provisions of 
the will that are the product of undue influence 
are invalid. The circumstances that may give rise 
to a presumption of undue influence are a testator 
who is known to be susceptible to undue influ-
ence, a confidential relationship between the tes-
tator and the person allegedly exercising the influ-
ence, and a provision for the confidant in the will 
that is unusual. 
The will has no legal effect during the life of the 
testator. It can be amended at any time or revoked 
in its entirety by a subsequent writing executed by 
the testator in accordance with the formalities re-
quired for a will. A will can also be revoked by 
the testator by destruction or by drawing lines 
across its face with the intention to revoke the will. 
The testator may execute a new will any number 
of times. 
The will may contain several different types of 
gifts. With the "specific gift" the testator disposes 
of specifically described land or jewelry or other 
property. A ,testator who makes such a gift as-
sumes that she will own that property at her deatli; 
if she does not, the gift may fail. Another form of 
gift is the "general gift," in which the testator dis-
poses of a certain sum of money to a person. If 
there is insufficient cash in the estate to pay the 
gift, the executor sells assets of the estate to pro-
duce cash sufficient to pay the gift. A form 
of gift is the "residuary gift." When the testator 
executes a will, she does not know exactly what 
she will own at the tir 
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